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Medicare Competitive
Pricing
Many lawmakers have embraced the idea of bringing
more competition to the Medicare program as a way to
achieve greater cost efficiency and provide more choice
for beneficiaries. Advocates of this strategy believe
Medicare should move away from its historical adminis-
trative pricing approach toward a competitive bidding
process similar to those used by many private purchas-
ers. Both President Clinton’s Medicare reform proposal
and the one developed by Sen. John Breaux (D-La.) and
Rep. Bill Thomas (R-Calif.) would rely on a form of
competitive pricing to achieve their objectives.
The idea is that the government will no longer tell
health plans how much it will pay to provide care, but
rather the plans will tell the government how much care
will cost by submitting bids. The Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), or another entity as proposed
by Breaux-Thomas, would then use those bids—not
administrative calculations—to establish payment rates.
Yet, despite support for the concept, every effort to
test it in the marketplace has been met with strong opposi-
tion. Proposed demonstrations launched by HCFA in
Baltimore and Denver collapsed after local and state
officials mounted campaigns against each of the projects
and ultimately succeeded in bringing them to a halt.
Congress then mandated the Medicare Prepaid
Competitive Pricing Demonstration as part of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA). To address some
of the concerns raised in Baltimore and Denver, the
BBA established two types of advisory committees to
assist—and in some ways wrest control from—HCFA
in its efforts to conduct a competitive pricing demon-
stration. First, the BBA created a Competitive Pricing
Advisory Committee (CPAC), a national committee of
independent experts that represent beneficiaries, health
plans, providers, purchasers, and other technical ex-
perts, to make design recommendations and select up to
seven sites for the demonstration. Second, the BBA
called for an area advisory committee (AAC) at each
demonstration site to assist in implementing the demon-
stration and adapting the overall design to local circum-
stances and concerns.
In January 1999, CPAC selected Maricopa County,
Arizona, and the Kansas City metropolitan statistical
area (straddling the Kansas-Missouri border) as the first
two sites for the demonstration. Under the BBA, the
first two demonstrations were to have been imple-
mented on January 1, 1999, but CPAC—realizing that
this date was not feasible—voted at one of its first
meetings to delay implementation to January 1, 2000.
On July 22, 1999, CPAC voted to delay implementation
another year until January 1, 2001, based on input from
the local AACs.
Meanwhile, political opponents of the demonstra-
tion—led by health plans and providers from the local
communities—worked against moving the project
forward. A provision to prohibit implementation of the
project in any area until January 1, 2001, and in Phoe-
nix and Kansas City ever, was passed by the Senate as
Title IX of the Patient’s Bill of Rights (S. 1344).
Similar language that would effectively kill the demon-
stration was included as part of the Labor-Health and
Human Services appropriations bill (S. 1650) passed by
the Senate on October 8. While earlier versions of a
House managed care reform bill (H.R. 2824) contained
a similar provision, the final bill did not, and it was
ultimately defeated on October 7. As of this writing, no
other House vehicles were evident.
While the fate of the experiment is still uncertain, it
is clear that those participating in Phoenix and Kansas
City—notably private purchasers, consumers, and health
plans as well as HCFA—have already learned a great
deal about the types of issues that must be considered if
Medicare is truly to pay health plans in a competitive
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manner. In addition, they have learned much more about
the nature of the products being offered in those markets
and the competitive and political forces now at work.
This Forum meeting will explore the lessons that
have been learned so far in Kansas City and Phoenix. It
will look at the process CPAC has used to select sites
and receive input from the local communities, areas of
agreement and disagreement between CPAC and the
local AACs, and problems that have arisen, including
design considerations, timing issues, and statutory
limits. The meeting will also explore the reasons for
opposition to the project. Are the objections simply a
case of “not in my backyard” syndrome or are there
more fundamental design flaws that render the project
unworkable? Finally, the session will examine the
relationship of this demonstration to broader efforts to
reform the Medicare program.
OVERVIEW
In the past, government payments to health plans
participating in the Medicare program have been set by
administrative pricing methods, designed to pay 95
percent of estimated fee-for-service costs in a given
geographic area. This payment system—based on the
adjusted average per capita cost, or AAPCC—has been
widely criticized as uneven and inefficient. Some areas
receive high payments that enable health plans to offer
extra benefits at little or no added cost to Medicare
enrollees. But in low-payment areas enrollees have had
to pay substantial out-of-pocket costs for benefits
beyond the Medicare entitlement, even though all
beneficiaries pay the same Part B premium, regardless
of where they live. To address these inequities, the
BBA substantially restructured the system for setting
the rates that Medicare pays health plans (see NHPF
Issue Brief No. 730, “Medicare Pullouts: What Do
They Portend for the Future of Medicare+Choice?” for
more information). In addition, the BBA created the
Medicare Prepaid Competitive Pricing Demonstration
to test an approach under which payments to Medicare+
Choice plans in designated areas would be determined
based on competitive pricing methodology.
This statutory mandate follows earlier efforts by
HCFA to implement competitive pricing demonstrations
for Medicare-risk health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) in Baltimore (1996) and Denver (1997). Both of
these demonstrations were suspended prior to implemen-
tation because of  opposition by health plans and political
pressure at the state and national level. The American
Association of Health Plans (AAHP) filed a lawsuit
against the Denver demonstration and won a temporary
restraining order. The demonstration was eventually
killed by congressional action in an appropriations bill.
CPAC, the independent authority Congress estab-
lished in the wake of the concerns voiced in Baltimore
and Denver, is intended to “bring the experience and
judgment of a panel of national experts to the task of
designing a competitive pricing demonstration for
Medicare health plans.”1 The BBA required that CPAC
include “independent actuaries, individuals with exper-
tise in competitive health plan pricing, and an employee
of the Office of Personnel Management with expertise
in the administration of the Federal Employees Health
Benefit Program.”2
The members of CPAC are James Cubbin (chair-
man), executive director, General Motors Health Care
Initiatives; Robert Berenson, M.D. (co-chairman),
director, Center for Health Plans and Providers,
HCFA; John Bertko, chief executive officer and senior
actuary, PM Squared Inc.; Dave Durenberger, senior
health policy fellow, University of St. Thomas, and
founder, Public Policy Partners; Gary Goldstein,
M.D., chief executive officer, the Oschner Clinic;
Samuel Havens, health care consultant and chairman,
Health Scope/United; Margaret Jordan, health care
consultant and chief executive officer, the Margaret
Jordan Group; Chip Kahn, chief executive officer,
Health Insurance Association of America; Cleve
Killingsworth, president, Health Alliance Plan; Nancy
Kichak, director, Office of Actuaries, Office of
Personnel Management; Len Nichols, principal
research associate, the Urban Institute; Robert
Reischauer, senior fellow, the Brookings Institution;
John Rother, director, Legislation and Public Policy,
American Association of Retired Persons; Andrew
Stern, president, Service Employees International
Union, AFL-CIO; Jay Wolfson, director, the Florida
Information Center, University of South Florida.
To govern the committee’s deliberations, CPAC
translated the BBA statutory requirements for the
demonstration into five objectives:3
 To make the pricing methodology fair, balancing
concerns of cost, access, and quality.
 To use the demonstration to reform HCFA’s pricing
methodology by (a) reducing overall costs to Medi-
care and (b) increasing the number of beneficiaries
who are satisfied with Medicare+Choice.
 To set market rules and to determine what should
govern a health plan marketplace.
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 To show that competition can work based on perfor-
mance, rather than risk selection.
 To enhance consumer choice through educational
information.
One of the chief criticisms of the Denver demonstra-
tion was the lack of input from the local community.
Thus, to complement CPAC, the BBA provided for
local advisory groups—the AACs—in each demonstra-
tion site. The secretary of health and human services
appointed the members of each AAC, which were
required to consist of representatives of health plans,
providers, and Medicare beneficiaries. The AACs will
operate for the duration of the demonstration in their
respective locations. The purpose of the AACs, as
stated in the BBA legislation (Section 4012(b)), is to
“advise the Secretary concerning how the project will
be implemented in the area . . . [including] advice
concerning the marketing and pricing of plans in the
area and other salient factors.”
SITE SELECTION
Considering site selection to be one of its more
important tasks, CPAC devoted extensive attention to
this issue. After considering different models for sites,
CPAC ultimately settled on three models:
 Model 1: Sites that have high AAPCC rates and low
HMO market penetration and that meet certain other
market and beneficiary constraints
 Model 2: Sites that have high AAPCC rates and
high HMO market penetration and that meet certain
other market and beneficiary constraints
 Model 3: Sites that have low AAPCC rates and two
or more HMOs and that meet certain other market
and beneficiary constraints
CPAC used data from the 319 metropolitan statisti-
cal areas (MSAs) nationwide to systematically pare
down the number of sites in a series of steps. (See
Figure 1 below for a detailed flowchart description of
the steps followed by CPAC to select sites.) Informa-
tion on all 319 sites was derived from national sources
—such as census data, Medicare plan data, and the
industry-oriented Interstudy market report—on the
following variables: market characteristics, beneficiary
and other population characteristics, and health system
characteristics. As the process continued, CPAC
considered increasingly detailed information about each
site under consideration. HCFA regional offices col-
lected qualitative and other information, including size
of market, proximity to other health MSAs, number of
plans, market concentration of two largest plans, new
entry of plans, HMO nonrenewal/service reductions,
physician networks, employer considerations, Medicaid
issues, and the presence of hospital-medical school
influence.
Because of budget neutrality constraints placed on
the demonstration (discussed further below), CPAC
suspended consideration of low AAPCC sites, pending
further review. Ultimately, the committee narrowed the
list down in three steps, from 319 MSAs to 56, then to
9, then to 2. As the number of sites was reduced, CPAC
considered finer-grained data on the smaller number of
remaining sites. From this process, two sites emerged as
the most highly ranked: one Model 1 site (Kansas City)
and one Model 2 site (Phoenix-Maricopa). CPAC
considers the process it used to be “an orderly and
systematic method for selecting the first sites” and
believes it resulted in two sites that “should be strong
settings for testing and evaluating the effects of compet-
itive pricing.”4
The two sites were selected in January 1999, after
which the Department of Health and Human Services
selected AACs in each site. The Kansas City AAC met
for the first time on March 22, 1999; the Phoenix AAC
met for the first time on March 31, 1999.
Despite the methodical process, the selection of
Phoenix met with strong opposition. In an April 2 letter
to HCFA Administrator Nancy-Ann DeParle, the entire
Arizona congressional delegation said Maricopa County
did not meet the criteria for an effective demonstration.5
“Implementing this experiment in Phoenix would only
disrupt a market in which competition is already vigor-
ous, costs are low, and participation is high,” said the
letter signed by Republican Sens. Jon Kyl and John
McCain and by the six House members who represent
the state.
Opposition in Kansas City came a bit later in the
process and reportedly was led by the physician com-
munity. By July, all four senators from Missouri and
Kansas were opposed to moving the project forward. A
July 1 letter to DeParle signed by Missouri Sens. John
Ashcroft (R) and Christopher S. Bond (R) and Kansas
Sens. Sam Brownback (R) and Pat Roberts (R) stated
that “halting this project is necessary to protect the
health care of senior citizens and to assure that Medi-
care beneficiaries continue to have access to excellent
health care at prices they can afford.”6 They went on to
assert that Kansas City is “not an appropriate choice for
this demonstration.”
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HCFA regional offices' collection of qualitative/other information
 HMO nonrenewals/service reductions
 Proximity to other MSAs
 Number of plans
 Market concentration of 2 largest plans






319 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)
100 metropolitan areas with the highest AAPCCs
Medicare HMO penetration: 50 highest sitesMedicare HMO penetration: 50 lowest sites
Largest HMO market share: must be < 51%
Number of elderly: must be > 10,000 and < 500,000
Number of Medicare HMO enrollees: must be > 5,000
160 metropolitan areas with the lowest AAPCCs
Number of plans: must be 2 or more
Largest HMO market share: must be < 51%
Number of elderly: must be > 10,000 and < 500,000
Number of Medicare HMO enrollees: must be > 5,000
Remaining sites
 ("Model 1" = low HMO penetration)
 1.   Akron, OH
 2.   Atlantic-Cape May, NJ
 3.   Baltimore, MD
 4.   Bergen-Passaic, NJ
 5.   Boston, MA-NH-ME-CT
 6.   Bridgeport, CT
 7.   Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH
 8.   Dallas, TX
 9.   Jersey City, NJ
 10. Kansas City, MO-KS
 11. Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL
 12. Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ
 13. Monmouth-Ocean, NJ
 14. New Haven-Meriden, CT
 15. Newark, NJ
 16. St. Louis, MO-IL
 17. Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV
 18. Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD
 19. Youngstown-Warren, OH
("Model 2" = high HMO penetration)
1.   Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA
2.   Baton Rouge, LA
3.   Denver, CO
4.   Fort Lauderdale, FL
5.   Galveston-Texas City, TX
6.   Houston, TX
7.   Jacksonville, FL
8.   Las Vegas, NV-AZ
9.   Miami, FL
10. Nassau-Suffolk, NY





16. Riverside-San Bernardino, CA
17. Sacramento, CA
18. San Francisco, Ca
19. San Jose, CA
20. San Diego, CA
21. Santa Rosa, CA
22. Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL
23. West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL
Remaining sites
 ("Model 3" = low AAPCC)
 1.   Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY
 2.   Albuquerque, NM
 3.   Canton-Massillon, OH
 4.   Fresno, CA
 5.   Medford-Ashland, OR
 6.   Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI
 7.   Omaha, NE-IA
 8.   Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA
 9.   Salem, OR
 10. Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT
 11. Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA
 12. Spokane, WA
 13. Springfield, MA
 14. Vancouver, WA
(Same qualitative/other factors
as for high AAPCC sites)
Discussion of low AAPCC sites suspended,
pending further investigation of
budget neutrality issues
Candidates for the first 2 demonstration sites
Model 1: low HMO penetration
 1. Akron, OH
 2. Atlantic-Cape May, NJ
 3. Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH
 4. Kansas City, MO-KS
Model 2: high HMO penetration





Detailed market studies/investigations by HCFA regional offices
 Local market receptivity
 Potential for managed care growth
 Benefits offered by area health plans
 QA and performance measures for plans (e.g., HEDIS)
 Financial status of Medicare HMOs
First 2 demonstration sites
1. Kansas City (Missouri and Kansas)                   2. Phoenix-Mesa (Maricopa County)
Key to Flowchart:
Heavy boxes = Remaining metropolitan areas
      after each step
Light boxes = Criteria to use to select from
       remaining metropolitan areas
Source: Competitive Pricing Advisory Committee
Figure 1
Steps Followed by CPAC to Select Sites
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DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
Fulfilling its additional mandate of developing
recommendations for the basic demonstration design,
CPAC produced a design comprising four major com-
ponents. These concerned (a) which plans can and
which plans must participate, (b) the benefit package,
(c) the bidding process, and (d) the government contri-
bution to premiums.
Each local AAC was asked to provide recommen-
dations regarding (a) specification of the “market
norm” standard benefit package in each site, (b)
choice of the median or weighted average bid as the
government contribution rule, (c) an option to delay
the new risk adjustment system in the first year of the
demonstration (when the demonstration was to begin
in 2000), and (d) the question of whether plans should
submit separate bids on each county in the demonstra-
tion area or bid on a “reference” county with payments
to other counties determined by payment ratios under
the current system.7
Plan Eligibility and Participation
CPAC determined that all Medicare+Choice plans
are eligible to participate in the demonstration, with one
exception: medical savings accounts. The benefit
structures of medical savings accounts were thought to
be incompatible with other health plan types in a
competitive pricing demonstration.
CPAC also discussed the inclusion of the traditional
fee-for-service coverage in the demonstration. HCFA
advised the committee that it was the intent of the
demonstration to develop a pricing methodology for
Medicare+Choice plans only. (This issue is discussed
further below.)
Whether or not plans should be required to partici-
pate in the demonstration was another key question. In
other words, would there be an alternative payment
system available for plans that choose not to submit a
bid? The AAHP and others have argued that plan
participation should be voluntary. CPAC recommended
that all eligible plans not otherwise exempted be
required to participate in the demonstration, in order to
participate in Medicare. In an August 3 letter, CPAC
Chairman James Cubbin and Co-Chairman Robert
Berenson reinforced CPAC’s decision to make partici-
pation mandatory stating that “we would not be able to
have true competitive bidding if some competitors
could opt out of the bidding and not be affected by the
bidding results.”8
Benefit Package 
The question of whether or not benefits should be
standardized has often stymied health reform efforts in
the past. This issue was a major point of contention in
discussions among the Bipartisan Commission on the
Future of Medicare. Some argued that standardization
inhibits innovation and forces a “one-size-fits-all”
package on all beneficiaries, regardless of their personal
needs or circumstances; others argued that standardiza-
tion is crucial in a national entitlement for equity
reasons. In principle, CPAC agreed that health plans
should be allowed to submit bids for any package of
benefits of their own design that meets statutory re-
quirements.9 Ultimately, however, it decided it was
essential that plans submit bids on a standard benefit
package. The need for the government to assess bids
across plans and its desire to provide beneficiaries with
comparative information on managed care alternatives
outweighed other concerns in CPAC’s estimation.
Because most Medicare+Choice plans currently offer
benefits beyond the Medicare statutory entitlement,
CPAC decided that the standard benefit in the demon-
stration should be enhanced beyond the entitlement.
Specifically, there should be a national minimum
standard package composed of the basic Medicare
benefit package with a limited drug benefit ($500) with
cost sharing. CPAC determined that enhancements
beyond the national minimum should be determined
according to a local standard and should be set by the
AACs, in consultation with HCFA. One of the chief
concerns in the Baltimore and Denver experiences was
that beneficiaries would receive fewer benefits under the
demonstration. Moreover, plans were concerned that
they did not have enough opportunity for dialogue
concerning the overall design of the benefit package.10
Under the new demonstration, plans will also be allowed
to offer additional benefits beyond the local standard, as
long they reveal the prices of each of their supplemental
packages separately from their standard bid.
Both AACs set about this task by comparing the
current benefit packages being offering by Medicare+
Choice plans in their respective areas. Both AACs
reported that current packages varied widely and that
plans do not currently use standardized definitions, even
though they use the same terminology (for example,
ambulance services), making it difficult to compare
benefits. CPAC and the AACs found the drug benefits to
be especially confusing for plan comparison purposes
because plans compute them differently. For example,
although each plan might have a $1,000 cap on brand-
name products, some use the average wholesale price  to
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reach the cap, others use a discounted plan price, and still
others count Medicare-covered drugs in computing the
cap.11 In the end, both AACs came up with standard
benefit packages that were somewhat more generous than
the average plan offering in their areas.
In Kansas City, the standard benefit package cur-
rently includes limited coverage for routine hearing and
vision services. It does not include coverage of dental
services. Copays for primary-care physician visits were
set at $12, visits to specialists at $17. Kansas City
expanded the prescription drug coverage beyond the
national minimum to cover up to $1,000 per year. Now
that the demonstration has been delayed, the Kansas City
AAC will rework its benefit package to reflect changes
in the market norm. Because plans in Kansas City scaled
back their benefits and/or raised their premiums for
2000, the new benefit package will be less favorable to
beneficiaries than originally conceived.
The Phoenix standard benefit package is more
generous than that in Kansas City, which is not surpris-
ing because the AAPCC is higher in Phoenix and has
typically allowed plans to offer more extra benefits.
Among the benefits in Phoenix’s package are $10
copayments to primary-care physicians, specialists and
other outpatient services; $8 copayments for generic
drugs; and $18 copayments for brand-name drugs. The
prescription drug benefit will cover up to $2,000 in
brand-name drug costs; generics are not subject to the
limit. The package also will cover dental services, in
addition to limited hearing and vision services. It also
expands Medicare’s outpatient mental health benefit to
include alcohol and chemical dependency.
As the differences in these benefit packages demon-
strate, there is considerable diversity today, in terms of
prices and coverage of extra benefits that beneficiaries
receive from Medicare HMOs within and across
markets. While standardization for local bidding
processes can make benefits more comparable within
markets, more market competition could make geo-
graphic diversity greater and more visible over time,
which in turn, could raise difficult political questions.12
The Bidding Process
CPAC also had to consider how the bidding process
should be structured and organized to provide HCFA,
the plans, and other stakeholders with the needed
framework to obtain market-like processes. CPAC
determined that bidding cycles should be one year and
that they should match the schedule followed by other
Medicare+Choice plans as much as possible.
In its design report, CPAC notes that competitive
pricing programs in the public and private sectors have
different ways of processing the bids received from
managed care plans. “The public programs tend toward
formal processes with fewer opportunities for one-on-
one negotiation and exercises of buyer discretion, as
that is practiced in the private sector.”13
CPAC recommended that HCFA should determine
the results of bidding (a) from formal bids, rather than
negotiations, and (b) from the first round of bidding. If
the bids are unacceptable after the first round, HCFA
can request a second round of bids.
The Phoenix demonstration will involve 150,000
Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in 11 plans. Beneficia-
ries in Maricopa county number 355,000.14 The Kansas
City demonstration will involve six plans in 12 counties
that currently enroll 23 percent of the 230,000 area
beneficiaries.
Government Contribution to Premiums
Perhaps one of the most challenging issues facing
CPAC was how to set the government contribution
level. One view among economists would encourage
setting a defined contribution at the level of the lowest
bid to gain maximum efficiency. But CPAC chose a
middle ground based on several considerations. In a
soon-to-be published paper,15 CPAC member and
economist Len Nichols describes why the committee
decided not to go with the lowest bidder:
First, the lowest bidders may not have enough capacity
to handle their new demand, and this could force some
beneficiaries to pay extra out-of-pocket payments for
plans that were not their first choice. Second, this kind
of contribution policy could lead low income benefi-
ciaries to congregate in low bidding plans while higher
income beneficiaries gravitate toward higher cost
plans. This raises the specter of a two-tiered Medicare
program which has been largely avoided to date, by
design. Finally, and pragmatically, the reality is that
many Medicare+Choice beneficiaries today have
access to zero premium plans that provide benefits
beyond the statutory package. Moving to an efficient
pricing strategy precipitously would mean that most
current managed care enrollees would experience
competitive bidding first as a premium increase for the
same or lower benefits than they get now.
Ultimately, CPAC recommended that HCFA set the
government contribution to premiums as either (a) the
median bid (adjusted to reflect available capacity in
low-bid plans) or (b) the enrollment weighted average
bid. Both the Phoenix and Kansas City AACs asked
CPAC to set its contribution at the higher of the two.
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Plans that bid higher than the government contribu-
tion will have to charge the excess to beneficiaries in
the form of a premium. Plans that bid lower will be
allowed to retain the difference or (subject to HCFA
review) add benefits worth the difference. Some ana-
lysts have argued that the demonstration design re-
moves the incentive for plans to bid low. If even one
large-enrollment plans bids high, than all government
payments will be increased. Also, under the demonstra-
tion, plans can only add benefits if they bid low. There-
fore, the profit maximizing/risk-reducing strategy is to
bid at the expected weighted average premium.
Recently, some CPAC members have suggested
allowing plans that bid below the government contribu-
tion to provide premium rebates to beneficiaries. Both
Clinton’s Medicare proposal and the Breaux-Thomas
proposal would allow beneficiaries to pay less than the
Part B premium if they choose a lower cost plan.
Advocates of this approach believe they could have a
powerful effect on beneficiary choice of health plans
and thus could provide a strong incentive for low bids.
Both AACs opted to delay any change in risk adjust-
ment in year one, keeping the old, demographic-based
system of risk adjustment at the start. Both AACs have
criticized HCFA’s proposed approach to risk adjustment
and have indicated that they will present alternative
approaches for consideration. Originally, CPAC al-
lowed sites to consider delaying risk adjustment as a
way to mitigate change resulting from the demonstration
project. However, given the delay in starting the demon-
stration, HCFA will be implementing risk adjustment on
schedule in the two sites. At the CPAC meeting on
September 16, CPAC said it did not make sense to offer
the sites the option to delay risk adjustment and amend-
ed its design to include only the option for sites to
identify an alternative risk methodology.
Finally, several CPAC members have expressed a
strong interest in linking financial incentives to the quality
of care provided by health plans. A subcommittee has
been formed to explore the feasibility of creating an
incentive pool for high-quality plans. The incentive pool
would be created by withholding a percentage of savings
and distributing it later among plans, based on the
achievement of quality goals. For the early years of the
demonstration, CPAC recommended that HCFA rely on
the current plan qualification process and market competi-
tion to ensure quality. However, the one-year delay in the
implementation process has led some CPAC members to
believe the extra time may allow quality performance
rewards to be implemented soon.
Comparisons to AHCCCS
It is important to remember that the Phoenix commu-
nity comes to this demonstration project after 17 years
of experience operating the Arizona Health Care Cost
Containment System (AHCCCS), the state’s Medicaid
managed care program. The AHCCCS program has
often been touted as a model for the nation as an effec-
tive competitive pricing program. Not surprisingly,
Phoenix AAC members look to the AHCCCS model for
potential solutions to the questions raised by the Medi-
care competitive pricing demonstration. Indeed, the
AAC chairman, Joe Anderson, was an early deputy
director of the AHCCCS program, credited with many
of the program’s successful administrative features.
Of course, one of the most critical differences
between the proposed demonstration and the AHCCCS
program is the fact that Arizona requires mandatory
enrollment in AHCCCS plans for its Medicaid popula-
tion, with no fee-for-service option. The entire
AHCCCS program is conducted through contracts with
managed care organizations, providing a measure of
stability to predicted enrollment. On the contrary, the
Medicare demonstration allows beneficiaries to select
fee-for-service, which exacerbates HMO enrollment
unpredictability. However, it ultimately gives beneficia-
ries more choice. In addition, according to HCFA
officials, the exclusion of fee-for-service provides a
safety valve and relieves problems with access or
quality that were seen in earlier AHCCCS days.
The Phoenix AAC’s regulatory subcommittee has
asked whether CPAC and HCFA should consider an
alternative process that does not rely on competitive
bids to establish a standard government contribution.
Under the AHCCCS model, the government agency
establishes the acceptable range for bids through
extensive actuarial evaluations from experts in the field.
Plans are not told the range in advance, but those that
come in below or above the range are asked to resubmit
and reconsider their projections. AHCCCS does not
accept bids that come in below or above the range.
In addition, AHCCCS limits the number of contracts
available. For example, in a certain area, only two con-
tracts may be awarded to the top two plans; in more
populated areas, additional plans are allowed to partici-
pate. As a result, plans can build their rates more effec-
tively based on a predictable enrollment level. While this
definitely creates winners and losers, AHCCCS officials
say that, because their bidding process is well communi-
cated through bidders’ conference and other means, the
state has prevailed in all of the bid protests.
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Under the Medicare demonstration project, all plans
submitting a bid will be able to provide services under
Medicare. CPAC decided to allow all plans that meet
basic qualification standards to offer their products to
Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of price or recent
quality performance, in order to maximize plan partici-
pation. AHCCCS, on the other hand, attributes much of
its success to the ability to penalize or deny participa-
tion to plans with poor performance. AHCCCS evalua-
tors believe a critical element in the bid evaluation “is
the assessment of how each health plan will meet all
financial and operational requirements, ensure quality
in the delivery of services, and provide a sufficient
provider network to meet provider accessibility require-
ments.”16 Cost is just one of the evaluation criteria.
The Phoenix AAC’s regulatory subcommittee
recently criticized HCFA’s lack of integrated financial
oversight, stating that
compared to the AHCCCS program, the Medicare
demonstration creates potentially more financial
volatility for the participating health plans, but fails to
include adequate financial safeguards and oversight
appropriately integrated with the bidding and contract
performance.17
In addition, under AHCCCS, health plan contracts have
historically been awarded for a three-year period subject
to annual review and renewal as opposed to the demon-
stration project’s one-year bidding cycles.
CONCERNS
Several criticisms have been leveled at the demon-
stration project from the local communities, interest
groups, and CPAC members themselves. The key
concerns relate to the exclusion of fee-for-service,
budget neutrality, and timing.
Exclusion of Fee-for-Service
Since CPAC’s inception, several of its members have
expressed concern that the exclusion of fee-for-service
will reduce the usefulness of the demonstration’s findings
because there is not a “level playing field.” Some mem-
bers worry that it might “jeopardize the acceptance of the
demonstration by Medicare+Choice plans and limit
HCFA’s ability to (1) measure the impact of competitive
pricing and (2) generalize demonstration results to the
entire Medicare program.”18
Many health plans and some members of Congress
believe the exclusion of fee-for-service is a fatal flaw
that makes the demonstration project inherently unfair.
In a recent New York Times article, AAHP President
Karen Ignagni said that leaving the fee-for-service
program out of the demonstration “means that private
plans will be paid less than the Government plan,
forcing the private plans to crimp benefits while the
Government plan goes unscathed.”19 Health plans
believe the exclusion of fee-for-service could under-
mine the goal of fostering the availability of health plan
options to Medicare beneficiaries.
On the other hand, some members of CPAC, espe-
cially those from the private purchaser community,
question the feasibility of including fee-for-service in
the demonstration. Private purchasers are able to deliver
a large number of enrollees to the plan with the winning
bid. In Medicare, the beneficiary maintains control of
where he or she goes. In addition, the technical com-
plexities of adding fee-for-service to the demonstration
would be “mind-boggling,” according to CPAC mem-
ber Chip Kahn.
Political issues would be heightened as well. CPAC
member Len Nichols states that if fee-for-service
Medicare was forced to bid against HMOs at the
present time, without sufficient risk adjusters,
its premium would have to be high to cover the higher
(and unadjusted) costs of its relatively sicker en-
rollees. This would mean that people would likely
have to pay an extra premium out-of-pocket (beyond
the current Medicare Part B premium) to remain in
FFS [fee-for-service] Medicare, which would drive
the healthiest out of FFS and into HMOs and exacer-
bate the adverse selection which FFS Medicare
continues to labor under.20
Budget Neutrality
The BBA requires that the competitive pricing
demonstration be “budget neutral” (that is, payments to
health plans in each site cannot increase during the
demonstration). Because CPAC has recommended that
health plans in all demonstration sites bid on a mini-
mum standard benefit package that is more generous
than the standard Medicare entitlement, the budget
neutrality provision “virtually precludes conducting the
demonstration in a site that currently features low
payments to private health plans.”21
CPAC members—by a unanimous vote—believe
that
permitting budget neutrality over the entire demon-
stration (cross-site), rather than requiring each site to
have budget-neutral results (within-site) would
provide a more robust demonstration by providing a
new approach to redistribute the current skewed
payment levels.22
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However, others have noted that the political ramifica-
tions of transferring funds from savings in Phoenix, for
example, to a low-cost area such as Minneapolis seem
particularly troublesome.
In an analysis of the competitive bidding process
under Arizona’s AHCCCS program, Diane Hillman and
Jon Christianson found that competitive bidding, as
implemented in practice, is in general likely to have less
than ideal incentives for cost containment. They pointed
out that
for standard bidding processes to generate effective
price competition, public officials must be willing to
fund their programs at the level of submitted bids,
even if the required expenditures exceed budget
estimates. . . . Program implementors must accept the
outcomes of the bidding process as having greater
validity than their budget projections. This requires
sacrificing the appearance of budget control, and the
favorable media coverage associated with negotiated
“savings,” in favor of an uncertain and less visible
reduction in costs over a longer period of time, a
trade-off which most politicians are uncomfortable in
making.23
Moreover, because one of the stated objectives of
the demonstration project is to reduce overall costs to
Medicare, most health plans assume they will get less
from Medicare under a competitive bidding process
than they currently do. Thus, it is no wonder they have
not embraced this concept. Because this project is
inherently risky—with plans, providers, and beneficia-
ries fearful that they will get less—some have sug-
gested that extra funding be added to permit plans,
providers, and beneficiaries to be held harmless from
the negative consequences of this demonstration.
“Hold harmless” clauses were reportedly part of the
demonstration project in New Jersey that first tested
the diagnostic-related groups for use in paying hospi-
tals prospectively.
Timing
Timing has turned out to be one of the major objec-
tions to the demonstration project on two fronts: first,
the current turmoil in the Medicare HMO market which
has seen numerous plan withdrawals and service area
reductions throughout the country and, second, the
deadlines and timeframes included in the BBA.
Over the past two years, several Medicare+Choice
plans have decided to withdraw from the program or
reduce their service areas.24 Although only 5 to 6
percent of Medicare beneficiaries have been affected by
the withdrawals, the HMO exodus has been widely
publicized and has created disruption in the marketplace
and anxiety for beneficiaries. In addition, according to
HCFA’s latest status report, many plans have restruc-
tured their benefits in ways that increase enrollee out-
of-pocket costs and limit plan coverage, especially drug
benefits. Moreover, for the Medicare+Choice program
overall, monthly premiums paid by beneficiaries will
increase.25
Health plans have warned that the demonstration
project will only make matters worse and would end up
undermining the very system Congress is trying to
foster. Plans are concerned the demonstration will force
changes in enrollees’ benefits, premiums, or relation-
ships with physicians during a time when the market is
already unstable.26 Physician groups have also ex-
pressed strong opposition. According to the American
Medical Association, doctors in both communities have
expressed fear that the project would ultimately result
in fewer extra benefits and higher premiums for seniors
in their areas. They believe it would create “tremendous
pressure [on seniors] to change plans on a regular basis,
disrupting the continuity of care and patient-physician
relationships.”27 A minority of CPAC members also
supported delay of implementation because of events
occurring in the managed care sector. But the majority
of CPAC members supported proceeding with the
planning and implementation of the demonstration
because the “problems experienced by some plans are
likely caused by the problems with the current payment
system.”28 Thus, the demonstration could provide the
opportunity to try new payment methods that might be
more effective.
Finally, the local communities urged delay of the
demonstration largely on the grounds that more time
was needed for effective implementation. At its very
first meeting, the Phoenix AAC voted almost unani-
mously to recommend a year-long delay in implementa-
tion. AAC members expressed concern that the time
frames set out by the BBA were far too aggressive and
impossible to achieve. While the Kansas City AAC
reported that it was on track to meet its requirements,
the Phoenix AAC said they needed more time to
develop a benefits package and conduct outreach to
beneficiaries. When it became clear Phoenix would
likely be granted a one-year extension, Kansas City
AAC members voted on July 22 by a small majority to
request a one-year delay as well. The same day CPAC
granted these requests for delay, pushing the project
start date back to January 1, 2001. But committee
members also “unanimously reaffirmed the selection of
Kansas City and Phoenix as correct and sound.”
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THE FORUM SESSION
The focus of this session will be the lessons being
learned in Phoenix and Kansas City regarding competi-
tive pricing and the implications for broader Medicare
reform. A secondary intent is to help participants in the
Forum’s upcoming Phoenix site visit become familiar
with the competitive environment and current issues
facing Arizona health plans.
Key Questions
 What have been the chief stumbling blocks to
getting the project off the ground (statutory limits,
political opposition, design flaws)?
 What are the key differences between this demon-
stration and earlier efforts in Denver and Baltimore?
What are the similarities?
 What have been the key lessons learned so far in
both sites? What are the differences between the
Phoenix and Kansas City experiences?
 What might be learned if the demonstration moves
forward? What’s at risk?
 Will the one-year implementation delay allow the
demonstration to be more successful, or is it merely
a stalling technique?
 If efforts to stop the demonstration are successful,
what are the implications for future competitive
pricing demonstration projects? What are the impli-
cations for broader Medicare reform proposals based
on a competitive model?
Speakers
James Cubbin, CPAC chairman and executive
director, Health Care Initiatives, General Motors
Corporation, will provide an overview of the demon-
stration project and the site selection process. He will
discuss the key lessons learned so far from his perspec-
tive as a private purchaser, focusing on the way this
demonstration replicates the private-sector experience
and the ways it differs. As executive director for
General Motors (GM), he is responsible for all activities
related to the company’s health care initiatives, legisla-
tive analysis, and cost and quality improvements.
Cubbin joined GM in 1963 and has held a series of
engineering and legal positions, including general
counsel for Saturn Corporation and the Buick-Olds-
Cadillac Group. He presently serves as a member of the
Board of Directors of the National Committee for
Quality Assurance.
Robert Berenson, M.D., CPAC co-chairman and
director of HCFA’s Center for Health Plans and Provid-
ers, will review the lessons HCFA has learned so far
regarding this demonstration and will consider the
implications for Medicare competitive pricing in the
future. He will also report on the current status of the
Medicare+Choice program in terms of beneficiary
enrollment, health plan participation, and changes in
premiums and extra benefits offered. Before joining
HCFA, Berenson served as vice president of the Lewin
Group and for ten years as a founder and medical
director of the National Capital Preferred Provider
Organization. He also practiced medicine for 12 years
in a Washington, D.C., group practice.
E. J. Holland, Jr., chairman, Kansas City AAC, and
assistant vice president, Corporate Benefits, Sprint
Corporation, will provide an overview of the Kansas
City experience to date and reflect on future directions.
In his role at Sprint, Holland is responsible for the
company’s retirement and welfare benefits, including
purchasing health care for Sprint’s 70,000 employees
and 13,000 retirees nationwide. Prior to joining Sprint,
he was senior vice president, chief administrative
officer, and corporate secretary for Payless Cashways,
Inc., the Kansas City–based building materials retailer.
Before that, he had been managing partner and co-
chairman of the health law practice group of the Kansas
City law firm of Spencer Fane Britt & Browne, where
he spent almost 24 years representing employers,
particularly health care providers, in labor and em-
ployee relations matters.
Joseph P. Anderson, chairman, Phoenix-Maricopa
AAC, and president and chief executive officer of
Schaller Anderson Incorporated (SAI), will provide the
Phoenix perspective and the key lessons learned there
so far. Through an SAI management contract, he served
from 1989 to 1997 as president and chief executive
officer of Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc., Arizona’s
largest Medicaid managed care plan. Currently, he
provides oversight to the health plans managed by SAI
in California, Oklahoma, Maryland, and Missouri. He
is a former chairman of HCFA’s Medicaid Managed
Care Industry Group, which is aimed at promoting
Medicaid managed care programs. Prior to forming SAI
with Donald Schaller, M.D., in 1986, Anderson was
deputy director of Arizona’s AHCCCS program.
Robert D. Reischauer, Ph.D., member of CPAC
and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, will
discuss the implications of the demonstration project for
broader Medicare reform. From 1989 to 1995, Rei-
schauer served as the director of the Congressional
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Budget Office. He is an economist who has written
extensively on federal budget policy, Congress, health
and social welfare issues, poverty, and state and local
fiscal problems.
ENDNOTES
